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Timothy Macklem* Provocation and the Ordinary
Person
I. The Problem
As a defence to a charge of murder, provocation is at once the most
accessible and the most fascinatingly elusive of ideas. We are all familiar
with the concept of an emotional breaking point, and we are generally
prepared to recognize that a person pushed beyond that point may in
certain circumstances kill his or her tormentor. Yet in law, an acceptable
breaking point is very hard to define. As Dickson 3. (as he then was) said
in Linney v. The Queen, "provocation, in the relevant sense, is a technical
concept and not easy to apprehend" 1 It is also, unfortunately, a concept
that juries must wrestle with regularly, and for high stakes. Glanville
Williams points out that in England half the intentional killings of adult
males are committed in anger.2 And where those killings are found as a
matter of law to have been provoked, the average sentence there is from
three to nine years;3 where they are found to have been unprovoked,
however, the sentence is life imprisonment.
As a result of these factors, the legal definition of provocation has been
a matter of debate in both the courts and the legislatures of the common
law world for the last century and more. The Supreme Court of Canada
has recently made the latest contribution to that debate in R. v. HilL
4
II. Evolution of the Defence
1. Origins
Provocation is not a general defence. For most crimes, it is merely a
consideration that may be taken into account in sentencing. But in the
case of murder, provocation operates as a special defence that, if
successful, will reduce the charge to manslaughter. Its existence springs
from the fact that murder once carried with it a mandatory sentence of
death and even now carries one of life imprisonment. The reduction of
the charge to manslaughter allows the court to impose a sentence that is
*LL.B. Ottawa, 1985; B.C.L. Oxford, 1987.
1. [1978] 1 S.C.R. 646 at 652.
2. Williams, Textbook of CriminalLaw, (2nd ed. London: Stevens and Sons, 1983) at 524.
3. In Canada, the normal range is from one to ten years for domestic homicides and from three
to nine years for non-domestic homicides: Nadin-Davis, Sentencing in Canada, (Toronto:
Carswell, 1982) at 256-258.
4. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 313.
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in proportion to the moral gravity of the accused's conduct. In effect, the
defence acts as a device that enables the court to bypass the fixed sentence
for murder when justice and humanity require it.
The origins of the defence are ancient,5 and the earliest reports show its
close connection to the question of sentencing. According to Sir Thomas
Raymond in 1672,
John Manning was indicted in Surrey for murder, for the killing of a man.
And upon Not guilty pleaded, the jury at the assizes find that the said
Manning found the person killed committing adultery with his wife in the
very act, and flung a jointed stool at him; and with the same killed him;
and resolved by the whole court, that this was but manslaughter; and
Manning had his clergy at the bar, and was burned in the hand, and the
court directed the executioner to burn him gently, because there could not
be greater provocation than this. (my emphasis) 6
Sir Edward East, writing in his Pleas of the Crown (1803) 7 stressed the
extent to which the defence depended on the accused's reason and self-
control having been overborne by the provocation; in law, he said,
provocation must be
such.., as the law presumes might in human frailty heat the blood to a
proportionable degree of resentment, and keep it boiling to the moment of
the fact: so that the party may rather be considered as having acted under
a temporary suspension of reason, than from any deliberate malicious
motive.8
Tindal C. J. in R. v. Hayward9 expanded on this statement and made
clear that the defence was based on a response to human weakness
(whether of the species or the individual he did not say). He charged the
jury that they must consider whether the prisoner had acted
while smarting under a provocation so recent and so strong, that [he]
might not be considered at the moment the master of his own
understanding; in which case, the law, in compassion to human infirmity,
would hold the offence to amount to manslaughter only...10
Not every insult, however, could amount to provocation. The earliest
recognized ground was an act of violence offered by the accused.
Provocation was thus understood as violence produced by violence. To
this were later added the sight of a wife's adultery and the sight of
5. See: Watts v. Brains (1600), Cro. Eliz. 779 (K.B.); Royley's Case (1612), Cro. Jac. 296
(K.B.); Hale, Pleas of the Crown" A Methodical Summary, (London: Shrewsbury, 1678) at 48;
Hale, Historia Placitorum Coronae, (London: Gosling, 1736) at 453-454.
6. (1672), T. Raym. 212 (K.B.). For a fuller report see Maddy's Case, I Vent. 158.
7. East, Volume I, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown, (London: Butterworth, 1803).
8. Id at 238.
9. (1833),6 C.&P. 157.
10. Id at 159.
128 The Dalhousie Law Journal
sodomy being committed upon a son.1 Mere words, gestures or injuries
to property did not amount to provocation.12 Thus by the middle of the
19th century the defence had two basic requirements: first, the
provocation must have taken a form recognized by law, and second, it
must have had the effect of temporarily depriving the accused of his self-
control.
2. The Reasonable Man
It is clear from the above that some sort of objective standard was always
implicit in the defence. East's definition refers to "such a provocation as
the law presumes might in human frailty heat the blood". And the refusal
to recognize insulting words or gestures as grounds for provocation,
whatever their actual effect on the accused, suggests that the courts were
seeking to interpret and apply the defence in a manner consistent with the
general criminal law principle of providing a standard of conduct
applicable to all citizens alike. This tendency toward an objective
approach was reinforced by the need to test the credibility of an accused's
claim to have lost control of himself, at a time when an accused could not
yet testify in his own defence.
However, there was no explicit requirement that the defence meet an
objective standard until the decision in R. v. Kirkham, where Coleridge
J. (as he then was) instructed the jury:
Though the law condescends to human frailty, it will not indulge human
ferocity. It considers man to be a rational being and requires that he should
exercise a reasonable control over his passions.1
3
That direction was formulated into a test by Keating J. in R. v. Welsh. 14
The accused was a creditor who, having just lost an action against his
debtor, happened to meet him in a public-house. The accused's actions
were aggressive from the beginning and culminated in the fatal stabbing
of the debtor; the debtor's actions, on the other hand, were good-
humoured and pacific throughout. Defence counsel acknowledged that
the provocation in question was slight, but argued that the only issue for
the jury was whether the accused had been under the influence of an
ungovernable passion when he struck the fatal blow. Keating J.
disagreed. He charged the jury as follows:
11. ?. v.Fisher(1837), 8 C. &P. 182.
12. Stephen, Digest of the CriminalLaw, (London: Macmillan and Company, 1877) Art. 224.
See also East, supra, note 7 at 233.
13. (1837),8 C. & P. 115 at 119.
14. (1869), 11 Cox C.C. 336.
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The question, therefore, is - first, whether there is evidence of any such
provocation as could reduce the crime from murder to manslaughter; and,
if there be any such evidence, then it is for the jury to decide whether it
is such that they can attribute the act to the violence of passion naturally
arising therefrom, and likely to be aroused thereby in the breast of a
reasonable man... The law contemplates the case of a reasonable man,
and requires that the provocation shall be such as that such a man might
naturally be induced, in the anger of the moment, to commit the act.
15
It may be observed that, strictly speaking, these comments were obiter,
since the provocation in question did not fall within one of the grounds
recognized by law at the time, and the accused's reaction would almost
certainly have failed to meet even a subjective standard. Indeed, Keating
J.'s objective requirement not only did not form part of the defence as it
was set out in Stephen's Digest of the Criminal Law but was virtually
ignored for many years. Nevertheless it was later incorporated in the
criminal codes of several common law jurisdictions, including that of
Canada, and from at least 1914 on was recognized as the law of England.
(a) Emergence of the Reasonable or Ordinary Person Standard
Whatever Sir James Stephen may have thought of an objective
requirement in 1877, by 1879 such a requirement was part of the ill-fated
English Draft Code, 16 which Stephen himself helped to prepare. Section
176 of that Code provided, insofar as is relevant, that
[a]ny wrongful act or insult of such a nature as to be sufficient to deprive
an ordinary person of the power of self-control may be provocation, if the
offender acts upon it on the sudden and before there has been time for his
passion to cool. (my emphasis)
That definition was incorporated verbatim in the Canadian Criminal
Code, 1892, 7 and, with only minor changes in wording, has been carried
forward into the present Code. It also became part of the criminal codes
of New Zealand (1893)18 and Tasmania (1924)19 and its effects can be
traced in the criminal statutes of New South Wales (1883),20 Queensland
15. Id at 338.
16. Criminal Code Bill Commission [Lord Blackburn (House of Lords), Barry J. (Irish High
Court), Lush J. (English High Court), Sir James Stephen], Report of the Royal Commission
Appointed to Consider the Law Relating to Indictable Offences Cmnd. 2345 (1879), in XX
Reports from Commissioners, Inspectors, and Others (1878-79), at 169.
17. 55-56 Vic., c. 29, s. 229.
18. The Criminal Code Ac4 1893, 57 Vic., No. 56, s. 165. Repealed and replaced by Crimes
Act 1961, S.N.Z. 1961, No. 43, s. 169.
19. Criminal CodeAct 1924, 14 Geo. V, No. 69, s. 160.
20. Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1883, 46 Vic., No. 17, s. 370; repealed and re-enacted
by Crimes Ac4 1900, S.N.S.W. 1900, No. 40, s. 23; repealed and replaced by Crimes
(Homicide) AmendmentAc4 1982, S.N.S.W. 1982, No. 24, Sched. 1.
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(1901)21 and Western Australia (1902).22 Section 215 of the Criminal
Code now reads:
215. (1) Culpable homicide that otherwise would be murder may be
reduced to manslaughter if the person who committed it did so in the heat
of passion caused by sudden provocation.
(2) A wrongful act or insult that is of such a nature as to be sufficient to
deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control is provocation for
the purposes of this section if the accused acted upon it on the sudden and
before there was time for his passion to cool.22
It should not be overlooked that the incorporation of an objective
requirement in the statutory defence took place at the same time as the
old grounds for provocation were being abandoned and the definition of
the defence expanded to include "any wrongful act or insult". Once the
recognized grounds of provocation were abandoned, it was inevitable
that the role of the objective standard would be increased. In effect,
society wished to maintain its interest in the grounds of provocation, but
for reasons of justice and common sense wished to refrain from defining
them. The problem, of course, was that it was then up to the courts to
provide a definition indirectly, through their characterization of the
ordinary person.22b
In England, where no statutory definition of provocation existed, the
common law approach to the defence was finally settled by R. v.
LesbinL23 The argument against an objective standard had previously
been raised without success in R. v. Alexander,24 and in Lesbini Lord
Reading C.J. approved that decision and firmly rejected the contention
that an objective standard ought to reflect the mental ability of the
accused. Lesbini, who was found at trial to be hot-tempered and sensitive,
with defective control and want of mental balance, had taken offence at
certain jocular remarks made to him by a girl in charge of a shooting
gallery. As he approached the gallery the girl had said, "Iky wants some
21. The Criminal Code Act 1899, 63 Vic., No. 9, s. 268.
22. Criminal Code, 1902, 1 & 2 Edw. VII, No. 14, s. 243; repealed and re-enacted by
Criminal CodeAct 1913, S.WA. 1913, No. 28, s. 245.
22a. R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s. 215.
22b. It has also been suggested that the word "ordinary" was used in the Draft Code, rather
than the word "reasonable", because the ordinary person could more readily be believed to
have so far lost control of himself as to kill another. I do not share the view that a reasonable
man is not one who could give way to provocation. The reasonable man is not the perfect man,
after all, nor even always the rational man; he is simply, as Lord Diplock put it in Camplin,
the anthropomorphic expression of the standard of conduct that our society expects of its
members. Our society recognizes that its members may kill one another in extreme
circumstances, and is prepared to at least partially forgive them for doing so.
23. [1914] 3 K.B. 1116 (C.C.A.).
24. (1913), 9 Cr. App. R. 139.
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shots". A short exchange ensued, in which she explained that she had
only been joking and handed him a loaded revolver for use on the range.
Lesbini took the revolver and shot her instead of the target.
On appeal from conviction Lord Reading C.J. adopted the statement
in Welsh that "there must exist such an amount of provocation as would
be excited by the circumstances in the mind of a reasonable man, and so
as to lead the jury to ascribe the act to the influence of that passion".5 He
added:
This Court is certainly not inclined to go in the direction of weakening in
any degree the law that a person who is not insane is responsible in law
for the ordinary consequences of his acts.
26
Avory J. observed of the defence argument:
It would seem to follow from your proposition that a bad-tempered man
would be entitled to a verdict of manslaughter when a good-tempered one
would be liable to be convicted of murder.27
Following Lesbini the English courts took a two-step approach to the
defence of provocation. To succeed, an accused had to establish not only
that he had lost his self-control, but that a reasonable person would have
done the same. The appropriate test was summed up by Devlin J. in R.
v. Duffy in a direction that was approved by Lord Goddard C.J. on
appeal 8 as "as good a definition of the doctrine of provocation as it has
ever been my lot to read":
Provocation is some act, or series of acts, done by the dead man to the
accused, which would cause in any reasonable person, and actually causes
in the accused, a sudden and temporary loss of self-control, rendering the
accused so subject to passion as to make him or her for the moment not
master of his mind.29
This test was much the same as that set out in the Criminal Code, but was
not accompanied by the same abandonment of the recognized grounds of
provocation that, as a matter of principle, justified the extension of the
objective standard in the Code jurisdictions. It was not until the passing
of the Homicide Act 195730 that the English courts were compelled to
recognize words or gestures as acts of provocation (something they had
previously refused to do: see Holmes v. D.PP).31
25. Supra, note 14, at 338.
26. Supra, note 24, at 1120.
27. Id at 1118.
28. [1949] 1 All E.R. 932 at 933 (C.C.A.).
29. 1d at932.
30. 5 &6Eliz. II, c. 11.
31. [1946] A.C. 588 (H.L.).
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(b) The Reasonable Man Defined
The character of the reasonable man was first considered by the House
of Lords in Mancini v. D.PP32 Mancini was the manager of a club in
Wardour St. called the Palm Beach Bottle Party. The deceased was a
member of the club who had been involved in a violent altercation early
in the evening and who then returned to the club at between three and
four in the morning. He grappled with Mancini at the entrance and
Mancini stabbed him fatally with a seven-inch-long, double-edged
dagger. The House rejected the defence of provocation on the ground that
the mode of retaliation must bear a reasonable relationship to the
provocation (a questionable requirement to be made of a man who is
alleged to have lost his self-control), but in the course of his decision
Viscount Simon L.C. reformulated the objective test of provocation:
The test to be applied is that of the effect of the provocation on a
reasonable man, as was laid down by the Court of Criminal Appeal in Rex
v. Lesbin4 so that an unusually excitable or pugnacious individual is not
entitled to rely on provocation which would not have led an ordinary
person to act as he did.
33
The House of Lords took that approach a great deal further in the
infamous case of Bedder v. D.PP34 Bedder was impotent, a fact that
caused him a good deal of concern, and on the night in question he
sought to have intercourse with a prostitute. When he failed in the
attempt she jeered at him and pushed him away. He still tried to hold her
and she struck him twice. He then grabbed her, and she kicked him "in
the privates", at which point he stabbed her twice, causing her death. At
trial he pleaded provocation. The trial judge directed the jury that they
were not entitled to consider the accused's impotence in deciding whether
the reasonable man would have acted as he did and the jury accordingly
convicted.
The Court of Criminal Appeal approved that direction and held that:
... no distinction is to be made in the case of a person who, though it may
not be a matter of temperament, is physically impotent, is conscious of that
impotence, and therefore mentally liable to be more excited unduly if he
is "twitted" or attacked on the subject of that particular infirmity.35
The Court of Appeal's decision was thus premised on its treatment of the
accused's condition as a mental infirmity, namely, consciousness of
impotence that made him react more violently to the prostitute's blows
32. [1942] A.C. 1.
33. Id at 9.
34. [1954] 1 WL.R. 1110.
35. Id at 1121.
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than would a reasonable man. As the ascription of exceptional mental or
temperamental qualities to the reasonable man had been clearly ruled out
by Mancini, the Court of Appeal's decision did not represent a departure
from the previous law.
However, Lord Simond's judgement in the House of Lords did. He
rejected the argument that the reasonable man should be invested with at
least the physical qualities of the accused. In characteristic fashion he
remarked: "For that proposition I know of no authority; nor can I see any
reason in it".36 In his view it would be illogical to refuse to consider
mental characteristics yet agree to recognize physical defects, particularly
when in so many cases the former were the product of the latter. He
concluded:
It was urged upon your Lordships that the hypothetical reasonable man
must be confronted with all the same circumstances as the accused and
that this could not be fairly done unless he was also invested with the
peculiar characteristics of the accused. But this makes nonsense of the test.
Its purpose is to invite the jury to consider the act of the accused by
reference to a certain standard or norm of conduct and with this object the
"reasonable" or the "average" or the "normal" man is invoked. If the
reasonable man is then deprived in whole or in part of his reason or the
normal endowed with abnormal characteristics, the test ceases to have any
value.37
Apparently, in addition to his other virtues, the reasonable man is never
impotent.
This approach was endorsed by Fauteux J. writing for a majority of
the Supreme Court of Canada in Salamon v. The Queen.38 Salamon had
killed his landlady in what was apparently a fit of sexual jealousy; he had,
however, not only nursed his resentment for several hours but initiated
the train of events that led to the fatal incident. Fauteux J. was prepared
to dismiss the appeal on that basis alone. He went on, however, to
approve the following aspect of the direction given by the trial judge as
to the self-control to be expected of an ordinary person: "At this stage
you must not consider the character, background, temperament, or
condition of the accused. '39 Cartwright J., dissenting on another point,
also shared this view: "On this branch of the inquiry no account should
be taken of the idiosyncrasies of the appellant ... the standard to be
applied is that of an ordinary man".40
36. Id at 1122-1123.
37. Id at 1123.
38. [1959] S.C.R. 404.
39. Id at 410.
40. Id at 415.
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The Court reaffirmed this position in Wright v. The Queen.41 Wright
was a young man who had suffered as a child from a violent and
authoritarian father and who returned home to visit his parents after
some years of absence. On the night in question, the father became
infuriated on hearing that his son had acquired a revolver. He left home,
went to where his son was and roughly demanded the gun. The son, who
was quite drunk, replied, "I am twenty-one" and shot his father three
times.
In considering the defence of provocation Fauteux J. approved and
applied the comments of Lord Simonds L.C. in Bedder. In his view the
trial judge had erred in failing to instruct the jury that no consideration
should be given to the nature of the accused's relationship with his father,
or to his mentality, or to his drunkenness. He said:
While the character, background, temperament, idiosyncrasies, or the
drunkenness of the accused are matters to be considered in the second
branch of the inquiry, they are excluded from the consideration in the first
branch. A contrary view would denude of any sense the objective test.42
He concluded that it was a trial judge's duty to warn a jury not to give
any consideration to peculiar or abnormal characteristics of the accused.
This approach was taken to its most extreme conclusion in R. v.
Parnerkar.43 Parnerkar was a Hindu who had for some years courted a
Regina woman. They had exchanged letters after Parnerkar moved to
Toronto and he entertained hopes of marrying her and becoming a father
to her children. When the issue came up, however, she laughed at him in
front of the children, told him she would not marry a "black man" and
tore up his letters. She then told the children to go outside as she was
expecting her boyfriend to call. Parnerkar took a knife from his flight bag
and killed her.
At trial, psychiatric testimony showed that to a Hindu, the term
"black" referred to untouchables or criminals, and hence was highly
provocative. Moreover, Hindus born in India, as Parnerkar had been,
where literacy was rare, attached great importance to letters and invested
family correspondence with great emotional significance. The destruction
of a letter amounted to the destruction of the bond between the author
and the recipient. Relying on this testimony, the trial judge put
provocation to the jury.
The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal held that the trial judge had erred.
Culliton C.J. held that to consider Parnerkar's background in evaluating
41. [1969] S.C.R. 335.
42. Id at 340.
43. (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 11 (Sask. C.A.) affd [1974] S.C.R. 449.
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the deceased's conduct was to apply a subjective test: "The test to be
applied is, would the tearing of a letter be sufficient to deprive an
ordinary person of his power of self-control, and, in my view, it would
not."44 In his view the trial judge had also applied a subjective test in
considering the significance to Parnerkar of the word "black".
Accordingly, he allowed the appeal. Fauteux C.J., speaking for a
majority of the Supreme Court, affirmed.
45
It is significant that in none of these cases were physical characteristics
involved. All three decisions turned on the ascription of certain
temperamental characteristics to the ordinary person. Therefore, while
the statements made in Bedder were approved by the Supreme Court,
they were never applied in their full breadth.
III. Reform
1. Criticism of the Objective Standard
The objective standard clearly represents a compromise, and like most
compromises it has earned the love of few. As the Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment put it in its 1953 ReporL4
6
The rule of law that provocation may, within narrow bounds, reduce
murder to manslaughter, represents an attempt by the courts to reconcile
the preservation of the fixed penalty for murder with a limited concession
to natural human weakness, but it suffers from the common defects of a
compromise. The jury might fairly be required to apply the test of the
"reasonable man" in assessing provocation if the Judge were afterwards
free to exercise his ordinary discretion and to consider whether the
peculiar temperament or mentality of the accused justified mitigation of
sentence. It is less easy to defend the application of the test in murder cases
when the Judge has no such discretion.
The most common ground of criticism is also the most straightforward.
Simply put, it is that the reasonable man, as he is referred to by the
English courts, does not kill. Accordingly, if the objective standard were
to be vigorously applied, the defence of provocation would rarely, if ever,
be successful.
Moreover, in the law of negligence and in other areas of the criminal
law, the reasonable person test indicates an ethical standard, as Glanville
Williams points out. If, then, a reasonable person's reaction to
provocation is a rational act when judged by an ethical standard, one
must agree with Williams that it is questionable whether the offence of
provoked homicide should continue to be punished. As he says:
44. (1971), 5 C.C.C. (2d) 11 at 27.
45. [1974] S.C.R. 449 at 455.
46. Cmnd. 8932, para. 144.
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The reason why provoked homicide is punished is to deter people from
committing the offence; and it is a serious confession of failure on the part
of the law to suppose that, notwithstanding the possibility of heavy
punishment, an ordinary person will commit it.47
However, in the Canadian context, this debate is somewhat beside the
point. The reasonable man standard is only one response to the
fundamental question of whether our society should treat provoked
homicide as murder. Broadly speaking, only three responses are possible.
The first is to ignore provocation and treat the killing on the same basis
as any other homicide; both the courts and the legislature have shrunk
from the harshness of that conclusion, however, and will probably
continue to do so unless and until the mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment for murder is abolished.
The second possible response is to treat all homicides inspired by a
wrongful act or insult as manslaughter. This would involve the adoption
of a purely subjective approach, in which the jury would confine itself to
determining whether or not the accused had been deprived of his self-
control, and the judge would decide what sentence was appropriate in the
circumstances. Law Reform Commissions in New Zealand,4 Victoria 49
and South Australia50 have supported this approach and recommended
the abolition of the objective standard. In this country, however, such an
approach, attractive as it might be, is precluded by the language of the
Criminal Code, though the Law Reform Commission of Canada has
recommended that provoked homicide no longer be punished by a
minimum sentence.51
The compromise position, of course, and the one adopted both at
common law and by statute, is to say that provoked homicide can be
manslaughter in special circumstances. This shifts the focus of the defence
from the character of the accused to the nature of the circumstances in
which he finds himself. If a reasonable or ordinary person would have
killed in those circumstances, then the culpable homicide in question will
be treated as manslaughter rather than murder, despite the existence of an
intent to kill. Logically, perhaps, it should follow, as Williams suggests,
that where a reasonable person would commit the offence it should no
longer be punished. But our society's view of homicide is so strict that it
47. Williams, Provocation and the Reasonable Man, [1954] Crim. L. Rev. 741 at 742.
48. Criminal Law Reform Committee, Report on Culpable Homicide (1976), para. 16.
49. Law Reform Commissioner, Provocation and Diminished Responsibility as Defences to
Murder (Report No. 12,1982), para. 1.30(a).
50. Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Committee, Substantive CriminalLaw (Fourth
Report, 1977), para. 11.6.
51. Law Reform Commission of Canada, Homicide (Working Paper 33, 1984),
Recommendation 11.
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is unwilling to treat even provoked homicide by a reasonable person as
acceptable, however irrational in terms of pure logic that conclusion may
be. The defence is based, after all, on forgiveness, not approval.
Perhaps the logical difficulty arises from the language employed by the
English courts. As Lord Diplock put it in Camplin, "powers of
ratiocination bear no obvious relationship to powers of self-control". 52
However the Criminal Code speaks of the ordinary person and the issue
under the Code therefore is not whether the reasonable person would
have chosen to commit the offence but whether the ordinary person
would have lost his self-control. Since the ordinary person is necessarily
imperfect, he can be expected to lose his self-control if sufficiently
provoked. Consequently a strict application of the ordinary person
standard does not mean that the defence will never succeed, as William
suggests, or that the offence should not be punished.
The purpose of the ordinary person test, then, is to provide an
assessment of the insult offered to the accused in order to determine
whether it was grave enough to justify the accused's loss of control and
invoke the compassion of the law. Assessment of the insult necessarily
involves some acceptance of the circumstances of the accused, and the
crucial question for the courts, of course, is how far those circumstances
may be taken into account in order to fully appreciate the insult before
the objective test is turned into a subjective one and the ordinary person
becomes the individual accused. To largely ignore those circumstances,
on the other hand, is, as Williams points out, not only to overly restrict
the application of the defence, but to defeat its underlying principle.
Another major and related criticism of the objective standard is that in
its strictest form, as set out in Bedder, it is virtually meaningless. As
Murphy J. put it in Moffa v. The Queen.
The objective test is not suitable even for a superficially homogeneous
society, and the more heterogeneous our society becomes, the more
inappropriate the test is. Behaviour is influenced by age, sex, ethnic origin,
climatic and other living conditions, biorhythms, education, occupation
and, above all, individual differences. It is impossible to construct a model
of a reasonable or ordinary South Australian for the purpose of assessing
emotional flashpoint, loss of self-control and capacity to kill under
particular circumstances.
53
And in The Queen v. Welsh, Bray C.J. said of Bedder:
Comment on this decision, which we must accept, would be futile and is
best left to academic writers who are not restrained by judicial decorum. 54
52. [1978] A.C. 705 at 716 (H.L.).
53. (1977), 51 A.L.J.R. 403 at 412 (H.C.).
54. (1977), 16 S.A.S.R. 309 at 313 (S.C.).
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These reactions are perhaps inspired by the rather rigid language
employed in Bedder. Yet Murphy J. assumes that, even if Bedder were
not the law, it would be impossible, in theory or in practice, to interpret
the objective standard in light of the circumstances of the accused without
denuding it of its objectivity. Murphy J. was free to discard that standard
in favour of a purely subjective approach because he was writing in the
context of the common law defence of provocation. The challenge for a
Canadian court, faced with a statute that requires the application of an
objective standard, is to make that standard realistic without allowing it
to become subjective. It is a challenge to which I have already referred
and to which I will return later.
Critics of the objective standard also question whether a subjective
standard would in fact entitle a bad-tempered man to a verdict of
manslaughter but make a good-tempered man liable to conviction for
murder (cf Avory J. in Lesbini). They point out that a good-tempered
man faced with a trifling affront either does not kill or kills without
provocation, in which case he deserves his conviction for murder. A bad-
tempered man who allows himself to be provoked by such an affront is
still guilty of manslaughter and can be sentenced to life imprisonment, the
same penalty as for murder, at the discretion of the judge.
2. Legislative and Judicial Responses
(a) Britain
The harshness of the English common law was mitigated by the passing
of s. 3 of the Homicide Ac 1957. That section provides, insofar as is
relevant, that in determining whether the provocation in question would
have caused a reasonable man to lose his self-control, "the jury shall take
into account everything both done and said according to the effect which,
in their opinion, it would have on a reasonable man." The section did not
come before the House of Lords until D.PP v. Camplin (1977). 55
Camplin was a 15-year-old male. According to his testimony he had
visited the deceased in his flat, where he was first raped and then laughed
at for his shame. Overwhelmed by anger and humiliation he picked up
a pan and struck his tormentor a fatal blow to the head.
Lord Diplock, for the majority, took the opportunity to re-evaluate
Mancini and Bedder in light of the 1957 Act. In his view those cases
could no longer be supported. He summarized the proper approach to the
objective standard in a sample charge to the jury that provides, in part:
The reasonable man referred to... is a person having the power of self-
control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the
55. Supra, note 52.
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accused, but in other respects sharing such of the accused's characteristics
as they think would affect the gravity of the provocation to him...s6
At almost the same time that Chaplin was being decided, the Criminal
Law Revision Committee was preparing its own recommendations on
provocation. In its 1976 Working Paper on Offences Against the Person,
the Committee recommended that the reasonable man standard be
abolished and replaced by the requirement that "provocation is sufficient
if, on the facts as they appeared to the accused, it constitutes a reasonable
excuse for the loss of self-control on his part".
57
The English Law Commission's Report on Codification of the
Criminal Law58 proposes that the reasonable man standard embodied in
s. 3 of the Homicide Ac4 1957 be replaced by the following provision:
60. This section applies where -
b) the provocation is, in all the circumstances (including any of [the
accused's] personal characteristics that affect its gravity), sufficient
ground for the loss of self-control.
(b) New Zealand
In Camplin Lord Simon of Glaisdale suggested that the law as it then
stood in England was little different from that of New Zealand. He said:
I think that the law as it now stands in this country is substantially the
same as that enacted in the New Zealand Crimes Act 1961, section
169(2), as explained by the Court of Appeal of New Zealand in Reg. v.
McGregor.5
9
In New Zealand, the defence of provocation, as it was first enacted in
1893, was taken verbatim from the English Draft Code and hence was
identical to the Canadian defence. However in 1961 a special
amendment was passed to prevent the application of Bedder there. The
amendment provided:
169(2) Anything done or said may be provocation if
a) In the circumstances of the case it was sufficient to deprive a
person having the power of self-control of an ordinary person, but
otherwise having the characteristics of the offender, of the power
of self-control.60
If theory were closer to practice the application of this amendment
would have been straightforward. The section required the jury to
56. Id at 718.
57. Criminal Law Revision Committee, Working Paper on Offences Against the Person
(1976), para. 54.
58. The Law Commission, Codification of the CriminalLaw (Law Com. No. 143, 1985).
59. Supra note 52, at 727.
60. CrimesAct 1961, S.N.Z. 1961, No. 43, s. 169(2).
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imagine the reaction of a person identical to the accused in all respects
save one, that of self-control. Accordingly, the jury was to consider
individual circumstances in order to put the insult into context and
determine its gravity, but it was to ignore these circumstances when
assessing the self-control to be excepted of the accused. To borrow a
phrase, the standard was to be that of the ordinary person similarly
situated and similarly insulted.
In practice, however, the New Zealand courts found it necessary to
integrate some of the characteristics of the accused into the degree of self-
control to be expected of the ordinary person. In The Queen v.
McGregor,61 North J. took the position that the test of "ordinary self-
control", if unmodified in any way by the characteristics of the accused,
would be little different in effect from the traditional "ordinary person"
test, since the traditional ordinary person test amounted in practice to a
test of ordinary control. The court presumed that such a result could not
have been intended by the legislature, and held that "the offender must be
presumed to possess in general the power of self-control of the ordinary
man, save insofar as his power of self-control is weakened because of
some particular characteristics possessed by him".62 It thus placed itself in
the position of having to fuse two discordant notions, the subjective test
and the ordinary person test, without destroying the objectivity of the
ordinary person test. It did so by setting out an elaborate, almost tortured
definition of those traits in the offender that could be legitimately
regarded as characteristics of a person of ordinary self-control. To fall
within the definition the accused's traits must be not only definite but
sufficiently important to set him off from the ordinary run of mankind;
they must relate to the provocative words or conduct in question; and
they must amount to specific phobias rather than general weakness of
mind.63
This approach obviously runs the risk of being too refined, too close to
the merely semantic, for the average jury member to grasp, let alone
apply, even after explanation from the judge. Indeed the Criminal Law
Reform Committee of New Zealand reported in 1976 that in many cases
judges did little more than put the words of the section to the jury, with
perhaps the addition of selected quotations from McGregor. "These
explanations may be lucid to lawyers but, we are convinced, are
frequently too difficult for jurymen to comprehend fully. ' '64 The
61. [1962] N.Z.L.R. 1069 (C.A.).
62. Id at 1081.
63. Id at 1081-1082.
64. Supra, note 48, para. 15.
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Committee accordingly recommended that a discretionary sentence for
murder be established and the defence of provocation be abolished.
Yet in R. v. Newel165 Lord Lane C.J. held, relying on Lord Simon's
reasons in Camplin, that the test set out in McGregor was now the proper
test to be applied in England. After quoting at length from the reasons of
North J. he wrote:
That passage, and the reasoning therein contained, seem to us to be
impeccable. It is not only expressed in plain, easily comprehended
language; it represents also, we think, the law of this country as well as that
of New Zealand.66
Accordingly he dismissed the appellant's particular predicament from
consideration on the basis that it was merely transitory in nature:
The other matters advanced by Mr. Ashe Lincoln as being characteristics
which the jury should have been invited to consider, in examining what a
reasonable man might or would have done, are not characteristics at all.
The appellant's drunkenness, or lack of sobriety, his having taken an
overdose of drugs and written a suicide note a few days previously, his
grief at the defection of his girl friend, and so on, are none of them matters
which can properly be described as characteristics. They were truly
transitory in nature, in the light of the words and reasoning of North J., in
McGregor's case.67
He held, therefore, that the trial judge had properly instructed the jury
members to ask themselves whether they would have reacted as the
accused had if their girlfriends had been insulted in the way his had been.
Leave to appeal to the House of Lords was sought on the ground that
North J.'s test should not be accepted to the extent that it failed to take
into consideration temporary mental states, but was denied by the
Appellate Committee.68 Newell has now been accepted as stating the law
on provocation in New South Wales69 and Victoria.
70
(c) Other Jurisdictions-
As noted above, Law Reform Commissions in both Victoria and South
Australia, where the defence is still a matter of common law, have
recommended the abrogation of the ordinary person standard by statute,
despite its liberalization in Camplin. In Eire, where provocation also
65. (1980), 71 Cr. App. R. 331 (C.A.).
66. Id. at 340.
67. Id
68. Id For criticism of the decision see Provocation - The Need for Radical Reform (1980),
130 New W. 618: "R. v. Newell demonstrates ... that the law as laid down in Camplin may
still lead to absurd results."
69. R. v. Croft [1981] 1 N.S.WL.R. 126 at 162 (C.C.A.).
70. R. v. Dincer, [1983] V.R. 460 at 463 (S.C.).
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remains a creature of common law, the objective test has been
abolished.71 In this country, the Law Reform Commission of Canada, in
its Working Paper on Homicide72 has recommended the creation of an
offence of "intentional homicide" with two degrees. Provoked homicide
would fall within the second, rather than the first degree, and hence
would be subject to a maximum rather than a minimum penalty of life
imprisonment.
IV. Options for the Future
We shall not cease from exploration
And the end of all our exploring
Will be to arrive where we started
And know the place for the first time.
- Little Gidding
As a matter of principle, as long as a minimum sentence for murder
exists, humanity and compassion require that some means of reducing
that sentence be provided where the accused's conduct was an
uncontrollable, albeit intentional response to grievous provocation. The
Criminal Code, like the common law, has adopted the device of reducing
the charge to manslaughter.
Again as a matter of principle, it would in my view probably be
desirable if the existence of provocation were to be assessed by purely
subjective standards. It seems both unfair and illogical to attempt to judge
an accused's inevitably personal reasons for his loss of self-control in
terms of the capacity for self-control of a hypothetical ordinary person. It
would be more appropriate, in my opinion, if any reservations our society
may feel about the accused's conduct were incorporated into the question
of sentencing, to the extent that they are not already embodied in the
requirement of a causal connection between the provocation and the
killing.
This approach is precluded, of course, by the presence of an ordinary
person standard in the Criminal Code. However, I think it is important
to recognize that the significance of the objective standard does not lie in
the fact that it embodies the principle that the criminal law must establish
and maintain a standard of conduct applicable to all. That principle could
have been as readily embodied in a purely subjective standard, which
would have left its protection to the trial judge and given effect to it
through sentencing. Instead Parliament, like the courts before it, has
preferred to employ the objective standard. In doing so, it has transferred
the assessment of our society's expectations from the judge to the jury.
71. ThePeoplev.McEuin (1978), 112 I.L.T.R. 53 (C.C.A.).
72. Supra, note 51. See also the discussion at 72-74.
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Accordingly, since the objective standard operates as a means to an end,
its ability to function effectively is central to its existence, and since it is
to be applied by the jury, simplicity and accessibility must characterize its
interpretation and application.
Assuming then that provocation is to be measured by an objective
standard and that that standard is to be interpreted according to the
principles suggested above, the question of how to determine the content
of that standard remains. The history of the development of the defence
suggests that three approaches are possible; I will evaluate these and add
a fourth, more closely tied to the language of the Criminal Code.
The most extreme form of objective standard is, of course, that set out
in Bedder. That standard ignores all features of the accused, physical or
mental, even for the purpose of assessing the gravity of the insult. In their
place it posits a hypothetical ordinary or reasonable person, deprived of
any element of context. Such an abstract being is, of course,
unimaginable, and amounts, as Lord Diplock says, to no more than the
anthropomorphic expression of our society's expectations. The fallacy
underlying this standard is that it assumes that our society expects the
same thing of each of us when in fact it does not; society's expectations
are inevitably modified, though never nullified, by context.
The injustice of the rigid objective approach, therefore, lies in the fact
that it strips the accused of that context, thereby depriving him of his right
to have his circumstances taken into account in assessing what is expected
of him. The black man is asked to be colourless, the blind man to see.
Such an approach violates the notion of individual responsibility: the
criminal law is expected to treat all equally, but not identically. That is
why the substantive requirements of the Criminal Code are tempered by
the sentencing discretion of the judge.
It must be remembered that the use of the ordinary person standard in
this context was a creation of the 19th century, the product of an era in
which it was commonly believed that there was an ideal standard of
proper behaviour, toward which all Englishmen should strive and to
whose minimum content all Englishmen must be held. Most Canadians
today no longer share that belief. We recognize that people of different
ages, sexes, colours, religions and races may have very different values, or
at least may well attach different weights to the same values. Each of us,
therefore, has his or her own way of meeting the community standard. It
is up to the law to accommodate the individual without betraying the
community.
The danger of such an approach is that in practice it will be ignored
in favour of other, equally unjust, but less recognized approaches. As the
Report of the Law Commissioner for Victoria puts it:
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The jury may impose their own standard in the wrong sense, La, what
would they have done if they were the accused? After all, who is more
ordinary or reasonable than we? Or perhaps (reverting to the situation in
Camplin's case) a juror will compromise - What would I have done if I
was buggered at 15 ?13
In Newell this approach was actively encouraged. The trial judge, in
his summing-up, told the jury:
You gauge what a reasonable man's reactions are; and a reasonable man's
reactions are essentially your reactions. Would any of you, individually or
collectively, have so behaved with that provocation? If you think you
would have, or you might well have, then he is entitled to the defence of
provocation...74
The Court of Criminal Appeal considered that direction "perfectly
proper". Proper it may have been, but to ask a jury to adopt this
approach is only reasonable as long as its members share the values of the
accused; where they do not it is patently unjust.
There seems to be general agreement that the rigid objective approach
should be abandoned. It was discarded by the House of Lords in Camplin
and, indeed, despite its approval in Wright it has never been applied by
the Supreme Court of Canada.
The compromise position, set out in Lesbini and Mancini, is to invest
the ordinary person with the physical characteristics of the accused, but
not with his temperament. In my view, this approach is as unsound as
that taken in Bedder and only marginally less unfair. It would make the
distinction between manslaughter and murder depend on whether the
provocation in question was directed at something the jury could see or
at something it could not. The ordinary person would thus have a sex and
a skin colour, but no religion, no nationality and no sexual orientation, to
pick a few obvious examples. Such an approach largely ignores the
principle of compassion for human frailty on which the defence of
provocation is based. Moreover it has the effect of according greater
significance to the external features of the accused than to his internal
qualities when the latter are, in many cases, more relevant to the
fundamental question of loss of self-control. As such it appears to be
based on a rough equation of the physical with the objective and the
mental with the subjective, an equation that is psychologically faulty,
since physical qualities may be as subjective as mental qualities and
mental qualities as objectifiable as physical. That being the case, there is
no reason in principle why mental qualities should not be incorporated
into the objective standard.
73. Supra, note 49, at para. 1.22.
74. Supra note 65 at 335.
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The unfairness of this approach is clear from the decision in Parnerkar.
Had Parnerkar indeed been black he might, if other conditions had been
satisfied, have succeeded in his defence. But because he was East Indian,
and because the significance to him of being called "black" was not
externally recognizable, he failed. Such a conclusion is manifestly unjust,
unless one takes the attitude that an East Indian is black in the eyes of the
average jury member. And even if one does, one would still be faced with
a case like Moffa, in which an Australian wife, toward the end of a long
night of domestic strife that culminated in her death, called her Italian
husband a "black bastard", a description that at least one member of the
Australian High Court felt "might have been an unbearable insult to a
person of the accused's origin.. .75 Moffa's defence succeeded because
his wife had also told him that she had tried and preferred every other
man on the street and offered nude photos of herself as proof. But if the
jury had had to rely on the epithet "black bastard", what significance
could they have attributed to it by looking at the accused?
A more recent and more liberal compromise is that set out in the New
Zealand Crimes Act and in Camplin, where the difficult feat of
interweaving the subjective and objective approaches was attempted. As
I indicated above, this approach credits the ordinary person with all the
characteristics of the accused, mental and physical, except his self-control.
Thus both subjective and objective considerations may be applied in
evaluating the gravity of the provocation, but only objective
considerations may be applied in assessing the self-control to be expected
of the accused.
I have said enough about the difficulties involved in the application of
this test in my discussion of R. v. McGregor that I need not review them
here. I would only emphasize that in my view it is impossible in practice
to distinguish between the gravity of an insult and the capacity of a
person to withstand it. Suppose a person was beaten as a child and now
reacts more abruptly to physical aggression than other people. Is his
reaction a measure of the significance of the provocation to him, or a
measure of his poor self-control in regard to that issue? In my opinion, a
jury member faced with such a situation could say no more than that that
person was particularly susceptible to that provocation. To ask him or her
to do more is unreasonable, probably psychologically invalid, and likely
to produce an unjust result.
Given the inadequacy of these approaches, it seems to me that a
resolution of the problem requires a return to the actual words of the
Criminal Code It defines provocation as an "insult... of such a nature
75. Supra, note 53 at 412, per Murphy J.
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as to... deprive an ordinary person of the power of self-control". 75a In
my view, these words must be read together, so that the term "ordinary
person" is interpreted in light of the function he is supposed to serve -
the evaluation of the nature of the insult. The proper response to the
question of what characteristics should be ascribed to the ordinary
person, and how far they may include the characteristics of the accused,
is to say, in effect, that the ordinary person should be endowed with such
characteristics as are relevant to the nature of the insult; that is, the
ordinary person should be placed in the circumstances of the accused as
the author of the insult knew or can be taken to have known them. For
the purpose of s. 215, therefore, the ordinary person should be a person
invested with such characteristics and experience of the accused as the
accused could reasonably expect the author of the insult to be aware of.
If the author was a stranger, those characteristics would probably be
physical, but if the author was an intimate (such as a husband or wife)
those characteristics should be held to include any idiosyncrasies of the
accused known to the author that are relevant to the insult. So if the
deceased in Parnerkar, for example, knew or could be expected to have
known of the cultural background that led Parnerkar to attach a special
significance to letters, or to being called black, the ordinary person
standard in s. 215 should be modified by that knowledge. There are
several reasons for this.
First, it protects justified expectations. No person is entitled to preserve
a special degree of sensitivity at the expense of his fellow citizens, and an
accused cannot, in normal circumstances, claim to have been legally
provoked simply because he is thin-skinned. This is the principle of
equality of responsibility. Our society is entitled to expect that its
members will possess or at least live up to a normal level of sensitivity.
The ordinary person standard has been created to protect that
expectation.
In many cases, however, we may be aware of the infirmities of our
fellows, and that awareness necessarily alters our expectations. At that
point we no longer have the right to treat a thin-skinned person like
everyone else. We have no right to exploit our special knowledge at the
expense of those who are hypersensitive or otherwise susceptible and
then expect that they will be held to an ordinary person standard. The
ordinary person standard is designed to protect those whose conduct is
innocent because it is ignorant. For example, in Lesbini, the girl who said
"Iky wants some shots" knew nothing of Lesbini's temperament and
hence of his volatility. Accordingly she had a right to expect that he
75a. R.S.C. 1970, c.C-34, s. 215.
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would be as thick-skinned as her average customer and Lesbini's peculiar
temperament was properly excluded from the jury's consideration of the
ordinary person standard. Had the girl been aware of Lesbini's character,
however, Lesbini should have been entitled to have that character taken
into consideration as part of the ordinary person standard, though
consideration would not necessarily have led to a successful defence.
The extent to which expectations are altered by personal knowledge is
particularly clear in the case of a husband and wife, as at least two recent
decisions have recognized. In R the accused, a South Australian woman,
had been the victim of what the court called "an appalling background
of domestic violence and ill-treatment, ' 76 that was "about as repulsive as
it is possible to imagine."' 77 Her husband had beaten and terrorized both
her and her children and unknown to her, had committed incest with
each of their daughters in succession, from as early an age as six. On the
day in question the youngest daughter told her mother that she had been
raped by her father at knife-point the night before. At that moment, the
accused later testified, she "seemed to freeze up, everthing went cold".
That evening her husband went out in the car with the same daughter and
attempted to rape her again. When he came home he told his wife:
We settled our differences. We are going to be one big happy family.
There isn't going to be no more talk about the girls leaving home.
78
Later, in the bedroom, he said to her:
We are going to be happy Jean. I love you. Why don't we go away for
a second honeymoon.79
After smoking several cigarettes, her emotions rising, the accused went
out to the shed, got an axe and hewed her husband to death. A majority
of the South Australian Court of Appeal held that the husband's conduct
had to be considered in its context in order to determine whether it
amounted to provocation in law:
The deceased's words and actions in the presence of the appellant on the
fatal night may appear innocuous enough on the face of them. They must,
however, be viewed against the background of brutality, sexual assault,
intimidation and manipulation. When stroking the appellant's arm and
cuddling up to her in bed, and when telling her that they could be one
happy family and that the girls would not be leaving, the deceased was not
only aware of his own infamous conduct but must also have at least
suspected that the appellant knew or strongly suspected tha4 in addition to
the long history of cruelty, he had habitually engaged in sexual abuse of
76. 28 S.A.S.R. 321 at 323 (C.C.A.).
77. Id at 328.
78. Id at 324.
79. Id
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her daughters. The implication of the words was therefore that this horror
would continue and that the girls would be prevented from leaving by
forms of intimidation and manipulation which were only too familiar to
the appellant. In this context it was, in my opinion, open to the jury to
treat the words themselves and the caressing actions which accompanied
them as highly provocative and quite capable of producing in an ordinary
mother endowed with the natural instincts of love and protection of her
daughters, such a loss of self-control as might lead to killing. (My
emphasis.)80
The court thus invested the ordinary person with the experience and
hence the sensitivities of the accused, where it was of the opinion that the
author of the provocation was aware of them or at least strongly
suspected their existence.
A similar approach was adopted by the Northwest Territories Court of
Appeal in R. v. Daniels.81 In that case a native woman, maddened by her
husband's treatment of her, responded to his latest infidelity by stabbing
his mistress to death. The court held that the ordinary person standard
should be modified so as to reflect the peculiar circumstances of being
married to Mr. Daniels. Laycraft J.A. wrote:
In my view, the objective test lacks validity if the reaction of the
hypothetical ordinary person is not tested against all of the events which
put pressure on the accused.82
A further advantage of the approach I am suggesting is that it is flexible
enough to accommodate the needs of our pluralistic and changing
society. Because it preserves the objectivity of the ordinary person
standard it helps to keep the defence of provocation in harmony with
contemporary attitudes, for what an ordinary person would regard as a
provocation justifying the loss of self-control will alter as social standards
alter. In 1672 it was held that there could be "no greater provocation"
than the sight of one's wife in bed with another man, but in my view it
is questionable whether the ordinary person in Canada today would
regard that sight, however distressing, as sufficient provocation to explain
the taking of a life. Therefore susceptibility of a kind that has become
socially unacceptable would cease to support a defence of provocation,
unless the accused could reasonably have expected the author of the
insult to be aware of it.
The ordinary person standard must also be flexible enough to change
not only with time but with circumstance. Members of a sub-culture may
have very different values from those of the dominant culture, or of
80. ld at 326.
81. (1983), 7 C.C.C. (3d) 542 (N.W.T.C.A.).
82. Id at 554.
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another sub-culture, and where both parties to a provocation are
members of a single culture, or at least share an understanding of that
culture, it would be unjust to judge their conduct by the standards of the
ordinary member of another culture, as Parnerkar makes clear. Equality
before the law requires not only the uniform application of laws but
different treatment of different cases. The approach I am suggesting
protects that equality, while retaining sufficient objectivity to also protect
the expectations of those who are ignorant of a particular cultural
context, as indicated above. I note that in Australia this position has been
adopted where the parties to a provocation are both aborigines. In R. v.
Muddarubba, Kriewaldt J. observed:
In my opinion, in any discussion of provocation the general principle of
law is to create a standard which would be observed by the average person
in the community in which the accused person lives. I tell you that if you
think the average member of the Pitjinjara tribe (and you must remember
these are "Myal" blacks) would have retaliated to the words and actions
of the woman by spearing her, then the act of spearing is not murder but
manslaughter. If provocation sufficient for the average reasonable person
in his community to lose his self control exists, then the unlawful killing
is manslaughter and not murder. I may be wrong but until put right by a
higher court I shall continue to tell juries that the members of the Pitjinjara
tribe are to be considered as a separate community for the purposes of the
rules relating to provocation. I shall not apply to them the standard
applied to the white citizens of the Northern Territory.83
Finally, because this approach is sensitive to individual circumstances,
it satisfies the principle on which the defence of provocation is based -
the need to grant a concession to human infirmity in extreme
circumstances.
All this is no more than to say that the ordinary person exists in a
context. To refuse to acknowledge that context is to hold the accused to
83. (1956), N.T.J. 317 (S.C.). See also Howard, What Colour is the 'Reasonable Man"?,
[1961] Crim. L. Rev. 41 and R. v. BalirBalir (1959), N.TJ. 633 (S.C.):
Similarly, I think a jury may say that something a white man might not regard as
provocation might be so regarded as an Aboriginal. To that extent, I think one can draw
a distinction between Aboriginals and whites, not by a different law, but by a different
application of the same law. I have to give you the same law for people who are black
in colour as for those who are white in colour. The law is that if a person acts under
the stimulus of provocation, the provocative acts being sufficient to cause the average
ordinary person to lose self-control, and death results from the actions of the provoked
person, that death is not to be regarded as murder, but only as manslaughter, because
of the provocation. I tell you that you are entitled to use your knowledge of Aboriginals
and to consider that although a white person may have cooled down, an Aboriginal
might not, that a white person would not have resorted to a knife for retaliation, but an
Aboriginal might. If you think that is a reasonable view to take of the circumstances of
this case, you are entitled to bring in a verdict of manslaughter.
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a standard of behaviour that the judge regards as conventional. To
acknowledge that context, on the other hand, is no more than to
recognize that values are relative, and that within the general moral and
criminal standard set by the Canadian community and expected of its
members there is necessarily scope for different understandings of what is
and is not provocation. In my opinion, the objectivity of the legal
definition of provocation is not reduced by making it flexible in this way.
V. R. v. Hill83a
Gordon Hill was a 16-year-old youth who had met and befriended an
older man, Verne Pegg, through the Big Brothers organization. The two
had known each other for about a year and Hill was spending the night
on Pegg's sofa when, according to his testimony, he awoke to find Pegg
caressing him. Shocked and enraged, he fled toward the bathroom for
safety. When Pegg pursued him, he grabbed a hatchet, which was lying
nearby with some camping equipment, and swung it, inflicting a deep
gash in Pegg's head. He then fled the apartment, clad only in his
underwear, returning a few minutes later to see if Pegg was all right. Pegg,
however, threatened to kill him, and in response Hill took two steak
knives from the kitchen and stabbed Pegg to death.
At Hill's trial for murder, Walsh J. charged the jury as follows:
First, the actual words must be such as would deprive an ordinary person
of self-control. In considering this part of the defence you are not to
consider the particular mental make-up of the accused; rather the standard
is that of the ordinary person. You will ask yourselves would the words or
acts in this case have caused an ordinary person to lose his self-control.
If you find that they were, you will then secondly consider whether the
accused acted on the provocation on the sudden before there was time for
his passion to cool. In deciding this question you are not restricted to the
standard of the ordinary person. You will take into account the mental, the
emotional, the physical characteristics and the age of this accused.84
Defence counsel objected to the charge and contended that the ordinary
person should have been defined as a person of the same age and sex as
the accused. Accordingly he invited Walsh J. to recharge the jury by
defining the ordinary person as "an ordinary person in the circumstances
of the accused". The judge refused and Hill was convicted of second
degree murder.
The Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a new trial.85 Brooke J.A.
(Martin and Morden JJ.A. concurring) held that the trial judge had erred
83a. Supra note 4.
84. Id at 341.
85. (1982), 2 C.C.C. (3d) 394.
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in refusing to define the ordinary person as a person of the same age and
sex as the accused. Age and sex, he reasoned, are not "peculiar
characteristics" to be excluded from consideration of the ordinary person
in the objective test:
The effect of the charge was that an ordinary person did not include a 16-
year-old or youth and may well have established as the standard an
ordinary person more experienced and mature than the ordinary 16-year-
old or youth.8
6
He held, therefore, that the judge's misdirection might well have seriously
prejudiced Hill and so his conviction could not stand.
A Crown appeal was allowed by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Although five separate reasons for judgement were delivered, six
members of the Court agreed with the Chief Justice's exposition of the
law. Of the remainder, Le Dain J. (dissenting) adopted a position very
similar to that taken in Camplin, while Wilson J., also dissenting, offered
a modified version of the Camplin approach.
After reviewing the case law, Dickson C.J. set out his own views as to
the appropriate content of the ordinary person standard. In terms of
mental characteristics he observed:
I think it is clear that there is widespread agreement that the ordinary or
reasonable person has a normal temperament and level of self-control. It
follows that the ordinary person is not exceptionally excitable, pugnacious
or in a state of drunkenness. 87
As to physical characteristics he held:
In terms of other characteristics of the ordinary person, it seems to me that
the "collective good sense" of the jury will naturally lead it to ascribe to
the ordinary person any general characteristics relevant to the provocation
in question.... Features such as sex, age, or race, do not detract from a
person's characterization as ordinary. Thus particular characteristics that
are not peculiar or idiosyncratic can be ascribed to an ordinary person
without subverting the logic of the objective test of provocation. 88
He concluded:
Thus the central criterion is the relevance of the particular feature to the
provocation in question. With this in mind, I think it is fair to conclude
that age will be a relevant consideration when we are dealing with a young
accused person.89
None of this is terribly helpful, to say the least. It is difficult to see in
what way our understanding of the word "ordinary" has been enlarged
86. at396.
87. Id at 331.
88. Id
89. Idat332.
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by the Chief Justice's equation of it with the terms "normal", "not
exceptional", "general" and "not peculiar or idiosyncratic". He tells us,
first, that the ordinary person has a normal temperament and hence is not
exceptionally excitable, pugnacious or drunk. This, of course, simply begs
the question of what is ordinary. It does not begin to tell us what a
normal temperament is, or what it means to be exceptionally excitable.
Second, Dickson C.J. tells us that an ordinary person has such other
general characteristics as are relevant to the provocation in question, and
goes on to treat "general characteristics" as equivalent to "particular
characteristics that are not peculiar or idiosyncratic". Again, to say that
the ordinary person has general characteristics, and that he is not peculiar
or idiosyncratic verges on the tautological and is certainly far from
enlightening. We are left knowing little more than that the ordinary
person has a sex, an age, and a race, as long as those features are relevant
to the insult in question. Even this, however, is cast in doubt by Dickson
C.J.'s conclusion that "age will be a relevant consideration when we are
dealing with a young accused person." No mention is made here of a
connection between age and the insult in question.
The best conclusion seems to be that the question of ordinariness is to
be resolved by the collective good sense of the jury. Dickson C.J. points
out that
... in applying their common sense to the factual determination of the
objective test, jury members will quite naturally and properly ascribe
certain characteristics to the "ordinary person".90
And later:
I have the greatest of confidence in the level of intelligence and plain
common sense of the average Canadian jury sitting on a criminal case.
Juries are perfectly capable of sizing the matter up. In my experience as a
trial judge I cannot recall a single instance in which a jury returned to the
courtroom to ask for further instructions on the provocation portion of a
murder charge. A jury frequently seeks further guidance on the distinction
between first degree murder, second degree murder and manslaughter, but
rarely, if ever, on provocation.9'
This last passage may be contrasted to the following comment in Linney
v. The Queen, where Dickson J. (as he then was) wrote:
Provocation, in the relevant sense, is a technical concept and not easy to
apprehend. The jury was clearly in a state of some doubt as it asked for
further direction on provocation 2
90. Id
91. Id at 334.
92. Supra, note 1 at 652.
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It may also be contrasted with the majority decision in Parnerkar, where
Fauteux C.J. held that the question of whether there was any evidence of
a wrongful act or insult such as to deprive an ordinary person of his self-
control was one for the trial judge:
If, then, the record is denuded of any evidence potentially enabling a
reasonable jury acting judicially to find a wrongful act or insult of the
nature and effect set forth in s.203 (3) (a) and (b), it is then, as a matter
of law, within the area exclusively reserved to the trial judge to so decide
and his duty to refrain from putting the defence of provocation to the
jury.93
In many cases, therefore, a judge could not follow the advice given in Hill
without shirking the responsibility cast upon him by Parnerkar.
Even assuming, however, that the issue of provocation is one that can
be left to the jury, and assuming too that juries are normally less doubtful
than they were in Linney, what conclusion are we to draw from the fact
that they do not seek further instructions? Clearly they are sure of their
conclusion, but can we be as sure of its justice? As long as the
provocation in question relates to a feature of the accused that can be
reasonably regarded as "general" or "normal", to use the Chief Justice's
words, a feature that the accused and the jury share in common, injustice
is unlikely. But if, as indicated above, the jury does not share or is not
sympathetic to the accused's sensitivity, an injustice may well arise, an
injustice that will be no less for the certainty with which a jury may
commit it.
Wilson J. took a different approach to the problem, one more closely
related to that adopted in Camplin. She based her interpretation of the
objective or ordinary person standard on the principle of equality of
responsibility. That principle would be violated, she reasoned, if an
accused were entitled to have a level of self-control lower than that
possessed by the ordinary person taken into account as part of the
objective standard. The principle would not be violated, however, if a
jury were permitted to take into account those characteristics of the
accused, mental or physical, that are relevant to the gravity of the insult.
Accordingly she concluded that for the purposes of a provocation defence
the objective standard should be that of the ordinary person similarly
situated and similarly insulted.
In my view, however, this analysis ignores the true meaning of
equality. Equality of responsibility is the purpose, not merely of the
objective standard, but of the criminal process as a whole. Because
equality of responsibility does not mean identity of treatment, that
process ensures that different responses are provided for different
93. Supra, note 43, [1974] SCR 449 at 454.
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situations. Thus, though offences on their face apply identically to all who
fall within their definition, equality of result is ensured by the provision
of discretion in sentencing. In the case of provocation, both the subjective
and the objective standards contribute to this goal of equality of
responsibility.
The problem with the traditional interpretation of the ordinary person
standard is that it gives that standard a fixed content instead of a fixed
weight. In my view, the ordinary person standard is an abstraction, and
represents the degree (or minimum standard) of society's expectations.
Those expectations apply equally, but not identically, to all of us. Thus to
give the ordinary person standard a fixed, albeit nominally neutral,
content in the shape of Everyman is to violate the principle of true
equality of responsibility, not to fulfill it. As I see it, Madame Justice
Wilson's judgement narrows the scope but does not alter the nature of the
traditional interpretation of the word "ordinary" and so fails to satisfy the
principle on which it purports to base itself.
In her judgement, Wilson J. states:
The objective standard, therefore, may be said to exist in order to ensure
that in the evaluation of the provocation defence there is no fluctuating
standard of self-control against which accuseds are measured. 94
It is true that there should be no fluctuating standard, but in my view
there should be a fluctuating content to that standard. The standard of
self-control is, as I said, an abstraction. In any particular case its content
must be established in light of the circumstances, though the degree of
responsibility will remain the same.
It also seems to me that Madame Justice Wilson's definition of the
objective standard is, as I indicated above, inaccessible to a jury. At an
abstract level one may be able to distinguish between the gravity of an
insult and the capacity of a person to resist it, but in practice I do not
think that it is possible to do so. Self-control of the kind we are talking
about in the context of provocation is not like good or bad temper. It is
something much more fundamental than an ordinary quality of
character, as is clear from the fact that its loss leaves a person in a state
of blind, murderous rage. In my view, one's degree of control in this sense
is not a general characteristic, but depends on the threat or insult in
question. As I argued above, in many if not all cases it is impossible to
say whether a person's susceptibility to provocation is a measure of the
gravity of the insult to him or of his poor self-control in relation to that
issue. I do not see how a judge could explain this distinction to the jury
and relate the evidence to it without in effect deciding the issue. If he
94. Supra, note 4 at 343.
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holds that a response is a measure of the insult the defence may succeed;
if he holds that it is a measure of the accused's poor self-control, it will
almost certainly fail.
Having set a standard of ordinary control to which all accuseds are
subject, Madame Justice Wilson then made an exception to it in the case
before her. Young people, she reasoned, are entitled to a reduced
standard of responsibility that reflects their age and level of development,
not out of any compassion on the part of the law for human infirmity, but
as a reflection of the rights and responsibilities of children in our legal
system.95 Personally, however, I am not at all convinced that, in addition
to its general provisions for young offenders, the law ought to make a
parallel provision for youth in the defence of provocation as long as it
denies that provision to other equally vulnerable members of society.
Assuming, without accepting, that children are more prone to murderous
rage than adults, I do not see why a 16-year-old should be permitted a
personal standard of self-control that is denied to those, for example, who
are mentally or emotionally handicapped.
Finally, Madame Justice Wilson concluded her judgement by holding
that the appropriate measure of the objective standard in this case was the
ordinary 16-year-old male subjected to a homosexual assault. This strikes
me as being inconsistent with her earlier conclusion that the objective
standard should be that of the ordinary person similarly situated and
similarly insulted. The facts of this case were that the accused, clad only
in his underwear, was sleeping on the sofa of a man who was acting as
his Big Brother when he awoke to find that man stroking his thigh. That
situation, involving as it does the grossest betrayal of trust and confidence,
seems to me entirely different from the kind of situation in which an
accused is subjected to a homosexual assault by a stranger in a public
place. A person of ordinary control might react very differently in the two
situations. In my view, to be consistent Madame Justice Wilson should
have said that the ordinary person in this case should be placed in the
exact circumstances of the accused, with all his characteristics except his
self-control, which should be that of the ordinary 16-year-old.
VI. Conclusion
Ultimately, as I have said, the majority decision in Hill does no more than
tell us that, where relevant, the ordinary person has a sex, an age and a
race. Because of the decision's limited scope and the frequency with
which the provocation defence is raised, the issue will almost certainly
come before the Supreme Court again. If and when it does, one can only
95. Idat 351.
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hope that the Court will adopt a more flexible approach to the question
of ordinariness, one more in line with our society and its notions of the
human will, perhaps along the lines suggested above. If life cannot be
breathed into the ordinary person test in this way, it should in my view
be abrogated by statute, either in favour of a purely subjective approach,
as Law Reform Commissions in Victoria and South Australia have
recommended, or in favour of a discretionary sentence for provoked
homicide, as the Law Reform Commission of Canada has proposed.
Then at least we would not be in the position of purchasing propriety at
the price of injustice.
In summary, the ordinary person standard is based on a common
understanding of what constitutes a mortal insult and should
consequently be available in all cases where the accused and the object
of his insult can reasonably be taken to share that understanding. As it
now rests, the effect of the standard is to deny the benefits of the defence
of provocation to minority groups, and to create a privileged position in
our criminal justice system for the white Anglo-Saxon (or in Quebec, the
white Gallic) majority. In recommending that this privilege be abolished,
and the conventional approach to the concept of the ordinary person be
abandoned in favour of a more flexible, shared-understanding approach,
I am not, I should add, expressing any kind of reluctance to call killers to
account. I do not doubt that while some Canadians, generally labelled
"liberal", might assume a more lenient approach to the defence of
provocation, many others, generally labelled "conservative", would
support a more stringent application of it. There is no reason that I can
see, however, why either group should interpret the defence in such a
way that only the majority can benefit from it. I am not taking sides,
therefore, on the law and order issue. In my view, there is no conflict
between a commitment to accountability and a commitment to
relativism.
It must be remembered that the defence of provocation was designed
as a limited act of clemency toward those whose predicament called for
our sympathy, and not as a device for imposing a national moral
standard. It follows that the values the ordinary person test invokes,
however stringently they may be applied, should not, except prima facie,
be those of the Canadian community as a whole (whatever they may be),
but rather those of the community of understanding shared by the victim
and his insulter. The former, more rigid national community approach
was only valid as long as it could be presumed that the defendant, the
victim and the jury all shared, or ought to have shared, this community.
Our legal history has clearly confirmed what our social instincts might
already have told us, that this is no longer the case.
